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in the United States. The proportion 
of recipients working increased 
substantially, and employment also was 
more prevalent among those leaving 
welfare. However, the kinds of jobs 
obtained by welfare recipients did not 
change dramatically. Expected earnings 
and job stability remained low for most 
recipients of cash assistance, and few of 
the jobs recipients landed could assure 
economic self-sufficiency. 
Despite the poor prospects offered 
by the average welfare recipient’s job, 
we find evidence that some jobs do offer 
greater opportunities. Even recipients 
who have had a string of dead-end or 
short-lived jobs may ultimately be able 
to obtain a job providing a reasonable 
chance for economic self-sufficiency. 
Federal and state reforms of the 
1990s have not altered this dynamic 
significantly. The goal of reduced 
dependency has been attained in that 
fewer individuals now receive cash aid 
and more are working. But there is no 
evidence that reform has substantially 
improved the lives of recipients or former 
recipients. 
Congress continues to struggle with 
reauthorizing the Personal Responsibility 
Act, having passed a series of temporary 
extensions since the Act expired at the 
end of September 2002. Yet differences 
between the House and Senate over 
work and participation requirements, 
allowable activities, and other issues 
have been substantial enough to keep 
those bodies from succeeding in crafting 
new legislation. Our research supports 
the view that the reforms of the 1990s 
were successful in moving individuals 
off the welfare rolls and into jobs. But 
if the ultimate goal is economic self-
sufficiency and not simply reductions in 
“dependency,” revisions of the program 
will need to go far beyond the reforms 
currently envisioned.
Notes
1.  Our analysis uses data from the county 
containing the central city. For convenience, we 
refer to each area by the city name.
2.  This figure is the sum of earnings for as long 
as the job lasts, up to eight quarters, with earnings 
adjusted for inflation and reported in 1999 fourth-
quarter dollars.
David W. Emmons, Eva Madly, and Stephen A. Woodbury
Refundable Tax Credits 
for Health Insurance
Dissatisfaction with the level 
and growth of the share of the U.S. 
population without health insurance 
has spurred interest in alternatives to 
the existing system of financing health 
care, which is dominated by employer-
provided health insurance among the 
nonpoor and nonelderly. One approach 
to reform would be to adopt a refundable 
tax credit for health insurance under 
the federal personal income tax. Such a 
policy would grant a tax credit up to a 
prespecified maximum—for example, 
$1,000 for an individual or $2,000 for a 
family—on a tax return where the filer 
purchased a private, nonemployer health 
insurance policy. For filers whose tax 
bill was less than the amount paid for 
insurance, the difference between the tax 
bill and the credit would be paid to the 
filer—hence, the refundable nature of the 
tax credit. 
The refundable tax credit is attractive 
for at least two reasons. First, it would 
make the same tax-favored treatment 
of health insurance available to all 
individuals, regardless of whether 
they are employed and regardless of 
whether their employer provides a 
health insurance plan. As a result, it 
should increase the number of insured 
individuals and decrease uninsurance. 
Second, a tax credit would generate 
growth in the market for private 
nonemployer health insurance and 
increase the population of health care 
consumers that have an interest in 
the characteristics and cost of their 
coverage. These informed, cost-conscious 
consumers could put a brake on 
increasing health care costs. 
The extent to which a tax credit for  
health insurance would reduce the 
number of uninsured individuals has been 
controversial. Pauly, Song, and Herring 
(2001) and others have simulated a 
variety of different tax credit policies and 
have found that a “reasonably generous” 
credit could reduce the number of 
uninsured individuals on the order of 50 
percent. However, simulations by Gruber 
(2000a,b) suggest that a health insurance 
tax credit might reduce the number of 
uninsured by only about 10 percent. 
Here, we summarize a recent study 
replicating and extending Gruber’s 
simulations (Emmons, Madly, and 
Woodbury 2005). Our goal is to 
illuminate Gruber’s modeling of health 
insurance coverage under a tax credit and 
to examine the sensitivity of the results to 
changes in the model’s key parameters; 
that is, we want to understand what 
makes the simulation model tick. The 
findings from this exercise are most 
relevant to Gruber’s widely discussed 
findings and to the particular tax credit 
analyzed. The simulations should not be 
interpreted as being relevant to proposals 
that, for example, would cover different 
populations, would apply tax credits of a 
different amount, or would eliminate the 
exclusion of employer contributions for 
employees’ health insurance premiums 
from employees’ taxable income. 
Outline of the Simulation Model
The simulation model we use is 
essentially a set of rules for determining 
whether a given individual (or family) 
would take up a federal refundable tax 
credit of $1,000 (for a single individual) 
NOTE: This article summarizes David W. 
Emmons, Eva Madly, and Stephen A. Woodbury’s 
“Refundable Tax Credits for Health Insurance: 
The Sensitivity of Simulated Impacts to Assumed 
Behavior,” Upjohn Institute Working Paper  
05-119, 2005. See http://www.upjohninstitute.org/
publications/wp/05-119.pdf.
Clearly, these wide simulated 
ranges highlight the uncertainty 
inherent in modeling the effects 
of health insurance tax credits.
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or $2,000 (for a family) for privately 
purchased health insurance. We follow 
Gruber in identifying four groups, each 
facing different circumstances with 
respect to health insurance: 
1) those currently covered by employer-
provided group health insurance, 
2) those covered by private 
nonemployer insurance, 
3) those covered by Medicaid, 
4) those currently uninsured. 
For each group, we specify an 
equation for the tax credit take-up rate—
the probability of a person accepting the 
tax credit. We also vary each take-up rate 
equation so as to give a lower-bound and 
an upper-bound take-up rate for each 
group.
For individuals currently covered 
by employer-provided group health 
insurance, we assume a lower-bound 
elasticity of take-up with respect to the 
subsidy provided by the tax credit of 
0.625 (relatively unresponsive behavior) 
and an upper-bound elasticity of infinity 
(that is, a worker with employer-
provided health insurance accepts the 
credit whenever he or she would incur 
lower expenses by doing so). For those 
currently covered by private nonemployer 
health insurance, the lower-bound 
assumption is that 50 percent would 
take up the credit, and the upper-bound 
assumption is that 90 percent would take 
up the credit. 
For those currently covered by 
Medicaid, we assume an elasticity of 
take-up with respect to the credit subsidy 
of 0.2. We then obtain lower-bound 
estimates of the take-up rate by imputing 
(or assigning) health insurance costs 
and expenditures to an entire family, 
and upper-bound estimates by imputing 
costs and expenditures to each individual 
separately. For currently uninsured 
families and individuals, we assume 
the probability of taking up the credit 
depends on income and the size of the 
subsidy, with an elasticity of take-up with 
respect to the subsidy of 0.625. Lower- 
and upper-bound take-up rates again 
come from imputing health insurance 
costs and expenditures to an entire family 
and to each individual separately.
The simulations are based on the 
March 1999 annual demographic file of 
the Current Population Survey (CPS), 
which has data on 132,324 individuals 
under age 65. We supplement the CPS 
with the 1999 Survey of Employer-
Sponsored Health Benefits, conducted 
by the Kaiser Family Foundation and 
the Health Research and Education Trust 
because the March CPS does not include 
data on the health insurance premiums 
paid by employers, or on employees’ 
contributions for employer-provided 
insurance. 
What the Simulations Suggest
 
Table 1 displays the main results of the 
simulation model outlined above—take-
up rates (columns 1 and 2), the number 
of individuals accepting the tax credit 
(columns 3 and 4), and the government’s 
net cost of a refundable tax credit 
(columns 5 and 6). Except for those 
already covered by private insurance, the 
figures reflect the number of individuals 
who switch from their current health 
insurance status to private nonemployer 
insurance. 
For individuals currently covered 
by employer-provided group health 
insurance, the simulations yield a 
broad range of take-up rates—from 
3.3 to 35.4 percent, depending on the 
underlying assumptions. Simulated 
ranges for the number of individuals 
who would switch from employer-
provided to private insurance (5–53 
million) and for the government’s tax 
expenditures on this group ($1.9–$22 
billion) are correspondingly broad. The 
lower-bound estimate of 3.3 percent is 
very close to Gruber’s estimate of 3.2 
percent, suggesting we have succeeded in 
replicating Gruber’s simulations. 
For individuals covered by private 
nonemployer insurance, the take-up rate 
is assumed to be 50 percent (the lower-
Table 1  Results of Simulation: Group Take-Up Rates, Number of Individuals 


























1)  Covered by employer-
provided group insurancea
a. Hedonic imputation of 
employer contribution
3.3 21.6 4.9 32.4 1.9 9.8
b. BLS imputation of 
employer contribution
7.4 35.4 11.1 53.2 5.5 22.0
2)  Covered by private 
nonemployer insuranceb
50.0 90.0 10.4 18.6 9.5 17.1
3)  Covered by Medicaidc 3.3 6.7 0.6 1.3 −2.2 −4.9
4)  Uninsuredc 17.5 28.3 7.7 12.5 7.4 9.7
Total — — 23.6–29.8 64.8–85.6 16.6–85.6 31.7–43.9
a For individuals covered by employer-provided group health insurance, lower-bound simulations assume 
an elasticity of take-up with respect to the tax subsidy of 0.625; upper-bound simulations are based on the 
assumption that all workers who would reduce their expenses by switching to private insurance do so. The 
alternative simulations for individuals covered by employer-provided insurance are based on two alternative 
imputations of the worker’s contribution to employer-provided group health insurance.
b For individuals covered by private nonemployer insurance, lower-bound simulations are based on the 
assumption that 50 percent of covered individuals accept the tax credit; upper-bound simulations are based on 
the assumption that 90 percent accept the tax credit. 
c For individuals covered by Medicaid and for uninsured individuals, lower-bound simulations are based on 
the assumption that decisions to accept the tax credit are made for entire families; upper-bound simulations 
are based on the assumption that decisions to accept the tax credit are made individually. 
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations.
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bound) or 90 percent (the upper-bound). 
The implication is that between 10.4 and 
18.6 million privately insured individuals 
would accept the tax credit, and that 
government expenditures on tax credits to 
these individuals would range from $9.5 
to $17 billion  (row 3 of Table 1). 
For individuals covered by Medicaid, 
the simulation model gives a take-up 
rate of between 3.3 and 6.7 percent, 
which implies that between 0.6 and 
1.3 million current Medicaid recipients 
would switch to private insurance (row 
4 of Table 1). Net government costs 
for those initially covered by Medicaid 
actually fall by $2.2–$4.9 billion 
because it is less expensive to subsidize 
private nonemployer insurance for these 
individuals than to provide them with 
Medicaid. 
For the uninsured, the simulations 
yield a lower-bound take-up rate of 17.5 
percent and an upper-bound take-up 
rate of 28.3 percent. It follows that the 
tax credit would reduce the number of 
uninsured by 7.7–12.5 million—from 
about 44 million (or 18.4 percent of the 
nonelderly U.S. population) to between 
31.5 and 36.3 million (or between 13.2 
and 15.2 percent). Gruber’s take-up rate 
(and the corresponding reduction in the 
uninsured population) is somewhat lower 
than our lower-bound estimate, but we 
come close to replicating his findings. 
The simulations suggest that tax 
credit expenditures on those who were 
previously uninsured would be between 
$7.4 and $9.7 billion—or between $776 
and $961 per newly insured person. 
However, the net government cost of 
the tax credit ranges from about $16.6 
to nearly $44 billion because the credit 
can be used by groups other than the 
previously uninsured. If the low end of 
the range ($16.6 billion) pertains, then 
the average cost to insure a previously 
uninsured person under the tax credit 
would be just over $2,100. However, if 
the high end ($43.9 billion) pertains, then 
the average cost per previously uninsured 
person would be about $3,500. 
Discussion 
 
What do we learn from these 
simulations? Our replications and 
extensions of Gruber’s (2000a,b) 
simulations suggest that a refundable tax 
credit of $1,000 for a single individual 
or $2,000 for a family for private health 
insurance would reduce the number 
of uninsured individuals by between 
17.5 and 28 percent and require new 
government expenditures of between 
$16.6 and $44 billion, of which about 
$7.4–$9.7 billion would be for coverage 
of previously uninsured individuals. 
Clearly, these wide simulated ranges 
highlight the uncertainty inherent in 
modeling the effects of health insurance 
tax credits. Pauly, Song, and Herring 
(2001) point to model specification and 
assumptions about the premiums faced 
by the uninsured as the main sources of 
uncertainty. These add up to uncertainty 
about individual and family take-up 
rates, and, as they write, “this uncertainty 
... should be front and center in the 
evaluation of tax credit schemes since we 
as analysts have minimal experience with 
large subsidies directed at low-income 
individuals.” In addition, some tax credit 
proposals could lead to broader changes 
in health insurance markets, such as 
greater price competition among insurers. 
This is yet another source of uncertainty 
in modeling tax credit proposals. 
The next question is whether direct 
empirical evidence could reduce 
uncertainty about tax credit take-up rates. 
Remler, Rachlin, and Glied (2001) and 
Currie (2004) have reviewed evidence 
on the take-up of a wide variety of social 
programs and show that take-up rates 
vary greatly from program to program. 
Their reviews suggest that little basis 
exists for choosing a most likely point 
estimate from the range of simulated 
take-up rates shown in Table 1—the 
lower-bound estimates in column 1 of 
Table 1 may well be too low, and the 
upper-bound estimates in column 2 may 
be optimistically high, but little more can 
be said.
Obtaining convincing empirical 
evidence on take-up of a health insurance 
tax credit will not be cheap—it may 
require a demonstration project or social 
experiment. But progress on the issue 
of tax credits for health insurance will 
require improved evidence on the likely 
take-up rate of a credit, and the time and 
expense of such a demonstration may 
well be justified if it leads to convincing 
estimates of how tax credits would expand 
coverage and what they would cost. 
David W. Emmons is Director of the Center for 
Health Policy Research at the American Medical 
Association, Chicago, Illinois.
Eva Madly is a research analyst at the W.E. 
Upjohn Institute. 
Stephen A. Woodbury is a professor of 
economics at Michigan State University and a 
senior economist at the W.E. Upjohn Institute. 
This article reflects the opinions of the authors 
and should not be interpreted as representing the 
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